Китай прекращает экспорт некоторых критически важных видов сырья, которые необходимы для технологий будущего и оборонной промышленности. Это шаг, который сильно ударит по США и ЕС. Сможет ли Канада восполнить этот пробел?

Газета The New York Times недавно сообщила, что китайское правительство намерено прекратить экспорт шести редкоземельных элементов, которые полностью перерабатываются в Китае.

Она также прекратит экспорт некоторых специализированных мощных редкоземельных магнитов, которые в настоящее время производятся почти исключительно в Китае, на долю которого приходится 90% мирового производства.

Сырье и специализированные магниты играют ключевую роль в высокотехнологичных секторах, таких как производство автомобилей, роботов и военной техники, такой как дроны и ракеты.

Китай разрабатывает систему регулирования, которая потребует от компаний подавать заявки на получение лицензий на получение определенного сырья, резкий шаг окажет существенное влияние не только на США, но и на Европу. В течение многих лет страны стремились снизить свою зависимость от Китая в отношении критически важного сырья, что вызвало глобальную гонку за обеспечение надежных альтернативных поставок.

Европа также смиряется с тем, что торговля с США сама по себе стала фактором риска. Европейский Союз импортирует несколько критически важных видов сырья из США. Например, около двух третей бериллия, используемого в ЕС, в настоящее время поступает из США, которые ЕС считает стратегическим ресурсом.

В 2024 году ЕС также импортировал почти 70% своей кобальтовой продукции, почти 60% медных сплавов и серебряного порошка и около половины концентратов молибдена из США. Немецкое агентство по сырьевым ресурсам (DERA) классифицирует все это как критически важное сырье.

As Inga Carry from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) told DW, helium, gallium, titanium and, to a lesser extent, rare earth elements are also imported from the US, which the EU classifies as strategic.

"We also still import a relatively large amount of coking coal from the US," she said. "This means that, for some materials, the US remains an important supplier."

Канада имеет давние традиции добычи полезных ископаемых

China's new restrictions mean the search for alternatives is becoming increasingly urgent. Many importers are now looking to Canada, a country with a long mining tradition. Around half of the world's publicly listed mining companies are based there. It has around 200 mines extracting various minerals and metals, many of which are classified as critical raw materials. More mines may now be established.

China is currently the largest producer of rare earth elements, but the largest known reserves are actually located in Canada, according to the Canadian government.

Carry said some of Canada's critical raw materials, such as coking coal and nickel, are already mined in commercial quantities, and a percentage of these are exported.

"Canada wants to increase the production of other raw materials it also considers critical — but its first priority is to meet its own demand," she added.

This means the EU shouldn't expect to be able to purchase these materials from Canada in the short term.

Furthermore, as Matthias Wachter of the Federation of German Industries explained, raw material projects have long lead times. On average, it takes 15 years to go from planning to approval and, eventually, extraction.

"I assume the process could be quicker in Canada, though, because many of these raw materials are already being mined," said Wachter. "Also, some Canadian provinces have already announced they'll be fast-tracking mining projects in response to the trade disputes with Trump."

Mining is usually very expensive and carries significant risks, while the unpredictable behavior of US President Donald Trump has created uncertainty in global markets, which discourages investment. In uncertain times, companies tend to be much more reluctant to invest.

Китайское влияние в Канаде растет

Over the past two decades, many Canadian mining ventures have been financed by Chinese companies. State-controlled Chinese corporations are major shareholders in two of Canada's biggest mining firms. According to the SWP, the Chinese company Shenghe recently acquired shares in Canada's only rare earth mine.

Another Chinese company, Sinomine, operates one of Canada's two lithium mines, in the central province of Manitoba. The lithium extracted there is then exported to China for further processing. Since 2019, Sinomine has also been operating a cesium mine in Canada, the only one of its kind in North America and Europe, and oversees all the processing of this critical mineral.

The SWP points out that this effectively gives China complete control over the cesium supply chain and raw material pricing.

Китай вытесняет конкурентов с рынка

"Processing, in particular, often takes place in China, not least because it's very energy-intensive and sometimes environmentally harmful," said Wachter. "There's also the fact that China has a targeted price and location policy for critical raw materials."

Важнейшее сырье, найденное в Канаде, включает графит (на фото), литий, никель, кобальт, медь и редкоземельные элементы© Себастьен Сен-Жан/AFP/Getty Images

Mining and processing in China are state-directed, and the price levels make it almost impossible for mining projects outside China to succeed commercially in a private-market context. As a result, many Western companies have had to withdraw from the raw materials sector.

Canada, meanwhile, also wants to become more independent of other countries. Since the end of 2022, foreign investments in critical raw material projects have been subject to national security reviews. The Canadian government has forced three Chinese mining companies to sell their stakes in two Canadian lithium exploration firms.

Canada is now offering tax incentives and funding to promote domestic raw material extraction, but the bulk of funding will still have to come from private investment.

США и Канада тесно взаимосвязаны

Even during Trump's first term, Canada sought to become more independent from the US. Instead, the opposite happened.

"A very large proportion of the raw materials mined in Canada are either processed in the US or exported there," said Carry. "Canada is the largest raw material supplier for the United States."

In light of the ongoing tariff disputes, Carry suggests that we can expect Canadian producers to look more to the European market: "Especially for raw materials that, until now, they have exported to the US, for which they're now seeking alternative buyers." However, Carry warns that China has established a quasi-monopoly on many critical raw materials. Neither the EU nor Canada will be able to become fully self-sufficient in these sectors.

Эта статья изначально была написана на немецком языке.

Author: Insa Wrede

Редкоземельные элементы и глобальное соперничество - Бурунди и реконфигурация стратегических цепочек поставок

Статья Института исследований внешней политики Филадельфии Артура Паликса

4 марта 2025 года президент США Дональд Трамп выступил перед Конгрессом в пользу сокращения бюджета USAID, агентства, отвечающего за содействие международному развитию. Иллюстрируя свою точку зрения, Трамп выделил Лесото, раскритиковав выделение 8 миллионов долларов стране, о которой «никто никогда не слышал». В то время как замечание Трампа вызвало возмущение среди властей Лесото, оно поднимает более широкие вопросы о подходе администрации США к Африке в то время, когда геополитический баланс сил на континенте быстро меняется.

В этом изменчивом ландшафте Бурунди, которую часто рассматривают как периферийную страну, требует особого внимания. Несмотря на то, что по площади Бурунди сравнима по площади с площадью около 27 900 квадратных километров, население Бурунди в шесть раз превышает население ее южноафриканского региона, с 13,7 миллионами жителей по состоянию на 2023 год. Бывшая бельгийская колония, получившая независимость с 1962 года, Бурунди находится в районе Великих озер, граничит с Демократической Республикой Конго (ДРК), Угандой и Руандой. В 1993 году Бурунди, исторически отмеченная периодическими конфликтами и глубокой этнической напряженностью между хуту и тутси, погрузилась в десятилетнюю гражданскую войну, приведшую к сотням тысяч смертей среди гражданского населения. Несмотря на то, что сельское хозяйство – в первую очередь кофе, чай и хлопок – составляет около 80 процентов рабочей силы, Бурунди остается одной из беднейших стран мира, где почти 90 процентов населения живет за чертой бедности. Помимо сельского хозяйства, Бурунди обладает значительным и в значительной степени неиспользованным минеральным потенциалом, в частности редкоземельными элементами, которые становятся все более важными по мере усиления международной конкуренции. Отнюдь не являясь еще одним слепым пятном на радаре Вашингтона, Бурунди вскоре может стать ключевым звеном в реструктуризации глобальных цепочек поставок критически важных минералов.

Район Великих озер: стратегический центр для критически важных ресурсов

Регион Великих озер Африки занимает центральное место в глобальных стратегических цепочках поставок полезных ископаемых. Поставляя примерно половину мирового тантала, необходимого для производства авиационных турбин и ядерных реакторов, а также значительные объемы олова, золота и вольфрама, этот регион является важнейшим узлом в промышленных цепочках поставок.

Mining in the Great Lakes has historically been characterized by substantial foreign intervention and informal networks largely outside state control. In response, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), comprising twelve member states, aims to enforce better-regulated frameworks. In 2010, the ICGLR launched the Regional Initiative against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, structured around six mechanisms to formalize mining and curb illicit trade. Continuing these efforts, the European Union recently committed €7 million ($7.5 million) for the project "Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region" (2024 to 2027). Managed by the ICGLR and the Canadian NGO IMPACT, the initiative focuses on modernizing mineral surveillance systems, reinforcing regional mineral certification, and facilitating market integration between Great Lakes states and international markets.

Бурунди: скромный игрок со значительными ресурсами

While Burundi remains a modest player compared to mining giants such as the DRC or Rwanda, it possesses considerable untapped mineral wealth. In 2006, the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy report highlighted Burundi's mineral potential, estimating reserves at 11,641 tons of nickel, 1,580 tons of vanadium, and 1.5 tons of gold. Recent reports by IMPACT broadened the spectrum of Burundi's mineral wealth to include copper, uranium, tin, platinum, tantalum, and cobalt. In 2019, the US Geological Survey attributed around 2 percent of global tantalum production to Burundi.

Resource management falls under the jurisdiction of Burundi's Ministry of Hydraulic Energy and Mines. Since taking office in 2020, President Évariste Ndayishimiye has adopted an assertive stance towards natural resource governance. In 2021, he halted foreign mining operations, denouncing unfair profit-sharing arrangements and the exploitation of national resources. In 2022, the government solidified this position by announcing that the Comptoirs miniers des exploitations minieres du Burundi (COMEBU), Burundi's national mining company, would become the exclusive operator authorized to conduct mining activities. Such nationalization has not dampened enthusiasm for exploration. A significant discovery announced in July 2024 revealed estimated tin and cobalt reserves of approximately 12.7 million tons, valued at over $50 billion.

Потенциал редкоземельных элементов

Rare earth elements, comprising seventeen essential metals indispensable to modern technologies, have become focal points of economic and geopolitical rivalry. From neodymium used in wind turbines to gadolinium in medical imaging, rare earth elements--often described as economic vitamins--play critical roles in advanced technologies, including military equipment like America's F-35 fighter jets. However, their extraction and refining processes are notoriously energy-intensive, expensive, and environmentally damaging.

In 2021, Burundi produced around 200 tons of these elements, ranking eleventh globally, but accounting for only 0.1 percent of worldwide production. Although modest, this figure requires context: Burundi's entry into the rare earth sector is recent, beginning only in 2017 with the Gakara mine (which is rich in bastnäsite and monazite), whereas the United States, China, and Japan established their industries in the 1990s. Moreover, Burundi's political instability has significantly hindered the sector's sustainable development.

Гакара: многообещающее, но застопорившееся Эльдорадо

With rare earth oxide concentrations ranging between 47 percent and 67 percent, Gakara, located in western Burundi, is among Africa's most promising rare earth deposits. At the same time, it highlights Burundi's structural challenges in fully leveraging its mineral potential.

Gakara was operated by the UK-based Rainbow Rare Earths (RRE) under a twenty-five-year contract which was abruptly halted by the Burundian government in 2021. This sudden halt underscored intensifying global competition for Rare Earths, jeopardizing Burundi and RRE's ambitions to offer credible alternatives to Chinese dominance in this sector. George Bennett, RRE's CEO, recently reiterated his commitment to prioritizing Western clients in order to reduce global dependence. This strategy is explicitly linked to the Phalaborwa project in South Africa, where RRE collaborates with the US government which invested $50 million in January 2024. With the current deterioration of US-South African relations, however, the future of this project remains uncertain. Still, it has reignited speculation about potential American backing for RRE's return to the Gakara project.

The relationship between RRE and the Burundian government is uncertain. In September 2023, RRE announced a reduction in its investments in Gakara, shifting its focus toward more stable projects--a decision that raises doubts about the future of this promising mining site.

Иностранные интересы и соперничество

Китай

China is the dominant player in the global rare earth market. With its industrial supremacy, comprehensive control of the value chain, and geopolitical leverage, Beijing enjoys an undeniable advantage over its competitors. As of 2023, China accounted for 69 percent of the world's rare earth mineral production, but its dominance is even more pronounced in refining, controlling 85 percent of global processing capacity for light rare earth elements and a staggering 100 percent for heavy rare earth elements. By comparison, the United States (12 percent), Myanmar (11 percent), and Australia (5 percent) lag far behind, underscoring China's near-total market control. Currently, no Western power can match China's sophisticated and tightly integrated industrial ecosystem, making any attempt at supply diversification extraordinarily challenging and further solidifying China's strategic indispensability.

Africa occupies a pivotal position in this geopolitical equation. China has steadily increased its foothold on the continent through extensive trade agreements and substantial investments. By 2023, Sino-African trade had reached $300 billion, making China Africa's leading importer of mineral resources, consuming around one-third of the continent's total mineral exports. In the Great Lakes region, Beijing deploys a comprehensive, multi-sector strategy, gradually expanding its influence.

China, for example, dominates much of the DRC's mining industry--60 percent of Chinese cobalt consumption originates from Congolese mines.

In September 2024, Rwanda reached a significant milestone in its relations with China, elevating bilateral ties to the level of a strategic partnership. China invests heavily in Rwandan infrastructure and agriculture, illustrated by a $60 million loan provided during the COVID-19 pandemic, a $40 million investment into the Giseke irrigation project, and the cancellation of a $6 million debt.

In Burundi, Beijing follows a similar pattern, enhancing its strategic partnership through increased trade--with Burundian exports to China at $10 million in 2023, contrasted with $105 million in Chinese imports to Burundi--and infrastructural investments, notably the railroad connecting Dar es Salaam to Burundi, vital for exporting minerals such as nickel.

Nonetheless, Beijing's expansive approach across borders has drawn criticism, particularly due to opaque contractual agreements and limited tangible benefits for local populations.

Given these dynamics, it is difficult to envision China overlooking Burundi's potential in rare earth elements. Strengthening Beijing's presence in Burundi's rare earth sector would further solidify its near-monopoly across the entire value chain. Politically, China already benefits from favorable conditions: Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC formally support Beijing's "One-China" policy, deepening diplomatic alignment. As the United States and Europe urgently seek to diversify their sources of rare earths, expanded Chinese control over Burundi's reserves would further entrench global dependence on Beijing.

Соединенные Штаты Америки

Faced with China's growing dominance in the rare earth supply chain, the United States' strategic posture is increasingly uncertain. The Trump administration has made its objectives clear: restoring American economic supremacy, particularly in regions and sectors where it has diminished. Within this broader geoeconomic context, securing access to critical natural resources, particularly rare earth elements, has become a top priority. In Ukraine, Greenland, or Canada, American mining initiatives primarily aim to consolidate control over strategic resources, sometimes at the expense of traditional multilateral diplomatic frameworks.

In this context, Burundi, though modest in production volumes, could represent a strategically valuable ally. The stakes extend far beyond mining. For Washington, Burundi offers an opportunity to establish a credible alternative to Chinese influence in Africa at a time when American presence on the continent is waning. Indeed, the recent defunding of USAID--a central pillar of American soft power in Africa--has created a strategic void quickly filled by Beijing. In Rwanda, for instance, the termination of approximately $170 million in annual American aid was perceived as a withdrawal, opening space for China to strategically invest in healthcare and agriculture, sectors previously supported by the United States.

The Gakara project therefore holds significant potential as a geopolitical lever to reignite American influence in the Great Lakes region. Coordinated and transparent resumption of RRE's mining activities, backed by a more balanced partnership with Burundi's government, could provide Washington with dual strategic benefits: securing vital rare earth resources and reinforcing geopolitical influence in a contested region. Yet, this ambition faces considerable obstacles. Burundi's institutional environment remains fragile, and mistrust towards foreign actors has deepened following previous mining ventures perceived as exploitative. Thus, for Washington, the challenge transcends economic interests--it must convincingly demonstrate that its model offers greater sustainability and equity compared to the Chinese alternative. Failing this, the United States risks being sidelined in an increasingly competitive struggle for critical African resources.

Механизм M23

The resurgence since 2022 of the March 23 (M23) Movement, an armed rebel group active in the eastern DRC, underscores a troubling geopolitical dynamic: the revival of hybrid conflicts that blend ethnic grievances, regional military strategies, and struggles over strategic resources. With support from Rwanda, M23 has recently seized control of Goma and Bukavu, two crucial urban centers in DRC's North and South Kivu provinces, thereby solidifying its grip over vital economic and logistical crossroads. Although ceasefire negotiations continue, fighting between M23 and the Congolese Armed Forces persists in the eastern DRC.

Though originally rooted in ethno-political tensions between Hutu and Tutsi groups, M23's contemporary agenda reveals a wartime political economy heavily focused on resource appropriation. The Movement's capture of the strategic Rubaya coltan mine in April 2024 serves as a clear illustration of this predatory logic. Coltan, a crucial mineral to digital technologies and defense industries, places these contested territories at the epicenter of a broader geopolitical competition over scarce resources. Beyond coltan, the DRC holds approximately 70 percent of the world's cobalt reserves and significant quantities of other strategic minerals, including gold, copper, lithium, and diamonds.

Burundi, a close DRC ally, carefully monitors these developments. Already hosting around 63,000 Congolese refugees, Burundi fears a potential spillover of violence onto its own territory. Beyond military solidarity, latent geopolitical tensions simmer between Burundi and Rwanda. Burundi's demographic majority of Hutus (comprising 83 to 85 percent of the population) contrasts sharply with President Paul Kagame's Tutsi-led regime in Rwanda, fueling underlying regional rivalries. In 2016, the United States accused Rwanda of interfering in Burundi's politics. More recently, in 2023, Kagame referred to the "pre-colonial borders of the Kingdom of Rwanda," encompassing Burundi, Uganda, and eastern DRC--a statement hinting at an expansionist regional vision from Kigali.

The international community's inability to coordinate a unified response to the rising power of M23 has created a strategic vacuum. This situation may catalyze shifts in regional power dynamics, with profound implications for Burundi's stability, the territorial integrity of the DRC, and the security of global supply chains for critical resources. A territorial escalation of the conflict would not merely constitute a humanitarian crisis, but a significant geopolitical challenge whose ramifications would extend far beyond Central Africa.

Переосмысление власти через ресурсы: стратегическая ставка Бурунди на редкоземельные элементы

Control over the rare earth value chain has emerged as a pivotal factor in contemporary geopolitical reconfigurations. These critical minerals, central to industrial, energy, and military competition, are reshaping global power dynamics between established and emerging nations. Mastering their extraction, refining, and commercialization processes is becoming a major lever of national sovereignty. Within this context, Africa, and particularly the Great Lakes region, occupies a position of crucial strategic importance.

Burundi, grappling with fragile governance, ongoing armed conflicts, and predatory exploitation of its natural resources, must also confront the significant social challenges inherent in rare earth extraction.

A World Bank report identified the inability to manage natural resources "transparently and equitably" as a major driver of forced population displacement. By 2024, nearly 6.9 million internally displaced persons were recorded in the DRC, primarily concentrated in the mineral-rich provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and Tanganyika. Inefficient redistribution mechanisms and porous regulatory controls, as highlighted by former Ambassador Pierre Jacquemot, underscore a systemic failure: the absence of a robust institutional framework to manage strategic resources effectively. This governance vacuum is typically filled by external actors--foreign states, multinational corporations, armed groups--operating under asymmetric conditions involving conditional investments, imported expertise, tax evasion, and the appropriation of trade flows through intermediary states. For instance, gold from South Kivu is routinely smuggled through Burundi, where export duties are lower, to markets in the United Arab Emirates, circumventing state control. Similarly, when foreign powers finance development projects, profits are often repatriated--for example, Chinese-funded infrastructure in Rwanda is largely executed by Chinese firms. Thus, the much-touted "win-win" rhetoric frequently remains theoretical. Added to these challenges are environmental concerns: Burundian experts already warn of ecological repercussions from future mining operations, particularly soil erosion and compromised water access for local communities.

Against this backdrop, Burundi stands at a decisive crossroads. One of the world's poorest nations, it now occupies a critical position within a highly strategic sector. It will require substantial support from both institutional and private actors to develop its rare earth resources sustainably. The decision to maintain COMEBU as the sole authorized operator reflects a broader pan-African trend toward asserting sovereignty over strategic economic sectors and reducing foreign interference. Yet, significant questions persist about COMEBU's technical capabilities and financial resources. Can Burundi realistically forego foreign investment without jeopardizing its mining potential?

In parallel, amid escalating tensions linked to the resurgence of the M23 rebel movement, the DRC has recently initiated discussions with the United States, seeking deeper US involvement in its mining sector, which has been historically dominated by China. This marks a pivotal moment in international competition over strategic African resources. As economic choices increasingly intertwine with systemic geopolitical rivalries, Burundi faces a unique opportunity to chart the future of its rare earth sector. The potential entry of African private investors deserves careful consideration. For instance, Nigerian magnate Aliko Dangote, committed to the development of African leaders, could represent a credible pan-African alternative through Dangote Mining, one that prioritizes African interests, promotes local redistribution of benefits, fosters skills transfer, and encourages regional economic integration.

Globally, rare earth extraction projects are proliferating. In Africa, fields such as Songwe Hill in Malawi, operated by the Canadian company Mkango Resources Limited, or Mabounié in Gabon (temporarily suspended but run by the Compagnie miniere de l'Ogooue, a subsidiary of Eramet and the Gabonese state), exemplify the continent's promising yet technically complex and economically risky deposits. Beyond Africa, initiatives are advancing in Ukraine, Greenland, and even France, where a recently announced mega-refining plant dedicated to heavy rare earth elements underscores Europe's determination to repatriate critical segments of the supply chain.

At a time when global powers are engaged in clashes over tariffs, targeted embargoes, and commercial rivalries over the control of natural resources, Burundi could find itself at a decisive crossroads in its history--if it succeeds in developing its rare earth potential in a sovereign and sustainable manner. In today's global economy of critical minerals, mastering one's natural wealth is no longer merely an economic issue: It is an act of sovereignty, a lever for emancipation, and a vital step toward enabling Africa to speak as an equal on the world stage.

В настоящее время Артур Паликс занимается мониторингом операционных рисков во французском банке Société Générale в Монреале. Он окончил Университет Сорбонны по специальности «Конкурентная разведка» и Школу экономической войны в Париже. Имея большой опыт в области политологии и геополитики, его исследования сосредоточены на динамике влияния между странами, с особым акцентом на Африку и Ближний Восток.

allAfrica.com

Минеральная игра Пакистана

Воздух в Исламабаде не просто влажный; он наэлектризован предвкушением. Как давний наблюдатель за экономическим процессом Пакистана, я чувствую настоящий ажиотаж вокруг предстоящего Пакистанского инвестиционного форума по минеральным ресурсам 2025 года. Впервые за долгое время я позволяю себе частичку искренней надежды.

Мы уже были здесь раньше, не так ли? Шепот о неиспользованном богатстве, грандиозных обещаниях, а затем часто о застое. Но если сделать шаг назад, то на этот раз все по-другому. Возможно, дело в весе ожиданий или в расстановке ключевых игроков. Каким бы ни был катализатор, этот форум является поворотным моментом – шансом превратить дремлющий минеральный потенциал Пакистана из пыльной мечты в ослепительную реальность.

Честно говоря, когда вы думаете об этом, огромные масштабы минеральных богатств Пакистана просто умопомрачительны, не так ли? Шестьсот тысяч квадратных километров – вот и представьте себе все эти спрятанные сокровища прямо у нас под ногами! Для тех из нас, кто глубоко переживает за Пакистан и кто наблюдал и надеялся на взлет нашей экономики, всегда было очевидно - мы сидим на золотой жиле, в прямом и переносном смысле! Конечно, дорога сюда не всегда была гладкой; У нас были свои удары и обходные пути, не так ли? Но знаете что? Это делает этот момент еще более захватывающим. Мы и раньше видели проблески гениальности, те искры потенциала, которые заставляли вас думать: «Да! Вот оно! И эти моменты поддерживали надежду, веру в то, на что способен Пакистан. А теперь, глядя на Национальную рамочную программу гармонизации полезных ископаемых, я вижу, как все вместе. Это ощущается по-другому. Кажется, что мы наконец-то используем эту невероятную энергию, устраняем препятствия и строим настоящую взлетно-посадочную полосу для взлета. Речь идет не только о диаграммах, графиках и экономическом жаргоне, понимаете? Речь идет о реальных людях, о реальных рабочих местах и о реальном прогрессе для нашей страны. Речь идет не о том, чтобы оглянуться назад на то, что могло бы быть; речь идет о том, чтобы ухватиться за этот удивительный шанс прямо сейчас и построить будущее, в котором Пакистан действительно сияет, подпитываемый невероятными ресурсами, которыми мы были благословлены. Забудьте о «потенциале» - кажется, что на этот раз мы действительно делаем это. Наконец!

Запуск Национальной рамочной программы гармонизации минерального сырья до 2025 года кажется важным шагом вперед. Это запоздалое, честное признание того, что старые подходы потерпели неудачу. Эта рамочная программа направлена на выравнивание игрового поля, способствуя прозрачному, предсказуемому климату для подлинного привлечения инвестиций - как внутренних, так и международных. Важно отметить, что это не просто еще один программный документ, предназначенный для отправки на полку.

Что действительно отличает эту инициативу, так это ее поддержка. Помимо министерских заявлений, внимание привлекает безошибочная поддержка начальника штаба сухопутных войск генерала Асима Мунира, направленная через Специальный совет по содействию инвестициям (SIFC). Несмотря на то, что SIFC привлекла к себе пристальное внимание, в этом контексте она означает национальный консенсус и стратегический приоритет, который ранее отсутствовал. Он предлагает обтекаемый, решительный подход, чтобы преодолеть бюрократическую инерцию. Это единство, если оно сохранится, может стать прорывом, которого мы так долго ждали.

Now, look, having been around the block a few times in this business, you learn to listen closely, right? We all know that grand plans on paper are one thing, but seeing them take flight, seeing them work in the real world - that's what truly matters. So, heading into the Islamabad Forum, yeah, I'm genuinely excited to hear about the presentations and commitments. But what I'm going to be watching for, what I'll be hanging onto every word about, are the clear signals they send to the folks who are ready to invest, to put their faith - and their hard-earned resources - into Pakistan's mineral sector. I want to hear about the tangible steps being taken to sweep away those old bureaucratic cobwebs, to make it easier and smoother for good projects to get off the ground. I'll be listening intently for how they plan to really roll out this Harmonization Framework across every province, making sure it's not just a nice idea in Islamabad, but something that makes a real difference on the ground, everywhere. These aren't just technical questions for me, you know? These are the real indicators - the ones that will tell us if this forum is going to be a turning point, a moment where we shift gears and truly accelerate towards unlocking Pakistan's incredible mineral potential. This is where the rubber meets the road, and I'm genuinely hopeful we're about to see some real traction.

Then there's Reko Diq. That name evokes a rollercoaster of emotions for anyone tracking Pakistan's economy. Its saga underscores the complexities of large-scale mineral projects. Forum updates on Reko Diq will be telling. It's a litmus test for investor confidence. Can Pakistan deliver on promises? Can it create a stable environment for long-term investments? Clear pathways, predictable rules, and robust dispute resolution - these are essential, not optional, for serious capital.

Yet, let's not dwell on past setbacks. Focus on the immense potential ahead. A vibrant mining sector isn't just about export revenue, though that's vital for our economy. It's about something deeper: creating sustainable jobs. Not just for urban professionals, but for communities in neglected regions. Imagine the transformative impact on areas long defined by poverty. Responsible, inclusive mining can be a powerful driver of social progress. If, and it's a significant if, environmental protection and community benefits are integral to every project. Discerning investors will scrutinize this as closely as regulations.

Globally, the landscape is also aligning favorably. The world races for critical minerals, vital for EVs and renewable energy. Pakistan, potentially rich in these resources, is now strategically positioned. The presence of international delegations, including the US, highlights this global interest. This is our chance to be more than a raw material supplier, to strategically integrate into global supply chains. We must be astute negotiators, ensuring partnerships genuinely benefit Pakistan long-term - fostering technology transfer, local expertise, and a value-added mining sector, not just extraction.

As I prepare for the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum 2025, I feel cautiously optimistic. This moment feels different. The convergence of government commitment, military support, and a tangible framework suggests a serious effort to unlock mineral wealth. The real test, execution and implementation, lies ahead. But this Forum offers not just a reset, but a potential springboard. A springboard towards a future where Pakistan's buried treasures emerge, fueling sustained prosperity and a brighter future for all Pakistanis. Let's hope, this time, the shine reflects genuine substance beneath.

The writer is a freelance columnist.

Daily Times

Трамп захотел создать запасы редкоземельных металлов для противодействия Китаю

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